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ABSTRACT 
The goal of our empirical analysis is to assess whether the changes in cigarette 
excise taxes and cigarette prices can be attributed to litigation brought by the states and 
the resulting settlements, holding other factors constant. Using pre-post as well as state 
excise taxes on beer as controls, the evidence provides support for the view that litigation 
changes the political equilibrium: state cigarette excise taxes were approximately $0.10 
higher in the post-MSA period. For tobacco prices, the increases are attributable to the 
method the settlement used to structure payments as well as the market structure of the 
cigarette industry.   
 3
In 1998, 46 states and the four major tobacco companies entered into the Master 
Settlement Agreement (MSA), which settled litigation brought on behalf of the states in 
order to recover medical expenses paid by government insurance agencies for illness 
brought on by consumption of tobacco products.
1 The four remaining states (Florida, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, and Texas) settled separately with the companies. The MSA 
stipulated that the tobacco companies pay the states an estimated $206 billion over the 
next several years.  
The strategy of using litigation as an instrument for discouraging consumption of 
a commodity deemed to be harmful to consumers is becoming more common.
2 The MSA 
makes payments from tobacco companies a function of number of cigarette packs sold by 
the tobacco companies. In this sense, the MSA payment structure resembles an excise 
tax. The impact that such litigation has on other tobacco control policies, such as excise 
taxes, depends on the extent to which litigation and such policies are substitutable.  
The MSA payments could substitute for excise taxes at the state level. This may 
be so to the extent that state legislatures have succeeded in levying socially optimal 
excise tax rates.
3 If so, states would be expected to have reduced excise taxes on 
cigarettes after the settlements were reached. Similarly, one would expect that various 
 
1 National Association of Attorneys General, Tobacco Settlement Documents, 
http://naag.org/issues/tobacco/index.php?sdpid=399, visited August 12, 2003. 
2 W.E. Parmet & R.A. Daynard, The New Public Health Litigation, 21 Annu. Rev. Public Health. 437 
(2000). 
3 There is some empirical evidence that state cigarette excise taxes are set at the level on average which 
accounts for the externalities that cigarette consumption causes (see Willard G. Manning et al., The Taxes 
of Sin. Do Smokers and Drinkers Pay Their Way? 261 JAMA 1604 (1989) and Willard G. Manning, 
Emmett B. Keeler, & Joseph P. Newhouse, The Cost of Poor Health Habits (1991)). But these results 
depend on treatment of secondary smoke within households (see Frank A. Sloan, Jan Osterman, & Gabriel 
Picone, The Private and Social Cost of Smoking (Manuscript, Duke Univ., 2003)) and not making 
assumptions that people smoke because they lack self-control. Assuming that smokers lack self-control, 
Jonathan Gruber & Botond Köszegi, Is Addiction Rational? Theory and Evidence, 116 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 1261 (2001), argued that in order for taxes to account for the internal costs of smoking in terms 
of life/years lost, taxes be set so as to yield a price of $30.45 per pack.   4
tobacco control policies, such as workplace smoking bans, would be substitutes, albeit 
imperfect ones, for state cigarette excise taxes and for penalties resulting from litigation 
that function as excise taxes. Alternatively, litigation and resulting settlement may have 
changed the balance of power between tobacco control advocates and the tobacco 
manufacturers with the consequence that the settlements and state excise taxes are 
complements. The tobacco industry’s influence of federal and state legislatures, 
historically, has been an impediment to enacting tobacco control legislation at either 
federal or state levels.
4 Rather than crowd out state excise taxes, there is crowd in.   
Another important feature of the settlements are their potential impact on 
consumption. In contrast to a lump sum payment, conceptually, the feature of tying 
payments to units sold should have caused the cigarette manufacturers to raise product 
prices. In recent years, the market for cigarettes has been an oligopoly controlled by four 
large firms. With this market structure, firms optimally shift excise taxes forward to 
consumers: price increases by more than the amount of the tax.
5 Also, the MSA could 
have provided an opportunity for cigarette manufacturers to collude on (a higher) price.
6
Finally, as cigarette prices rise, proportionately more highly addicted cigarette consumers 
remain. Consumption by the remaining smokers may be less responsive to price.
7 Lower 
price elasticities would lead sellers to boost price. For any or all of these reasons, 
smokers rather than the companies bear the burden of litigation.  
 
4 Graham E. Kelder & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Litigation in the Effective Control of the Sale and 
Use of Tobacco, 8 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 63 (1997); Parmet & Daynard, supra note 2. 
5 Don Fullerton & Gilbert E. Metcalf, Tax Incidence, in Handbook of Public Economics, Vol. 4 1787 (Alan 
J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds. 2002). 
6 Jeffrey E. Harris, The 1983 Increase in the Federal Cigarette Excise Tax, in Tax Policy and the Economy, 
Vol. 1 87 (Lawrence Summers ed. 1987). 
7 Typical estimates indicate that a 10 percent increase in the price of cigarettes would decrease consumption 
by four to seven percent (see, for example, W. Kip Viscusi, The Governmental Composition of the 
Insurance Costs of Smoking, 42 J. Law & Econ. 575 (1999)). 5
A cursory glance at the data supports the view that litigation changes the balance 
of power and that the settlement payment provisions function as an excise tax on cigarette 
consumption. Since the MSA and four individual state settlements were reached, the 
former in November 1998 and the individual settlements reached somewhat earlier, state 
legislatures have increasingly looked to state excise taxes on cigarettes as a source of 
revenue, relative to both excise taxes imposed on alcohol and state taxes more generally 
(Fig. 1). In particular, the largest jumps in the mean real state excise tax on cigarettes 
occurred in 1997 and 2002. In fiscal year 2003, for example, state excise tax increases 
were larger than any other single type of tax including major sources of revenue such as 
income taxes.
8 These increases did not coincide with increases in the mean real state 
excise tax on beer; the only year in which real state excise taxes on beer rose was 1998. 
Also, after a decline in cigarette prices from 1993 forward, there was a spike in mean 
cigarette prices of $0.73 per pack immediately after the MSA imposed a charge on 
participating companies of $0.62 per pack (Fig. 2), which is evidence that cigarette 
companies shifted the cost of the settlement forward to smokers.
9
Such trends could have been due to factors other than the settlement. The goal of 
our empirical analysis is to assess whether the changes in cigarette excise taxes and 
cigarette prices can be attributed to the settlement when other factors are held constant. 
Using pre-post as well as state excise taxes on beer as controls, the evidence on balance 
provides support for the view that litigation changes the political equilibrium. For 
 
8 National Governors Association & National Association of State Budget Officers, The Fiscal Survey of 
States viii (November 2002). 
9 This is the estimate of the cost of the settlement to participating companies given in W. Kip Viscusi, 
Smoke-Filled Rooms: A Postmortem on the Tobacco Deal 34 (2002). 6
tobacco prices, the increases are attributable to the method the settlement used to 
structure payments as well as the market structure of the cigarette industry.  
I. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
A. Excise Taxes 
In the simplest model of taxation and public spending, in which voters have well-
behaved preferences on a single issue, the median voter determines the equilibrium 
policy.
10 In this model, because the only route available for voters to let their preferences 
be known is through their vote, the equilibrium is determined by the distribution of 
preferences rather than the intensity of preferences. Preferences may differ systematically 
by demographic factors and income.  
This framework has been extended to include other sources of influence such as 
lobbying by special interest groups and richer distributions of preferences such as 
multidimensional preferences or ideology-based cohorts as in models of electoral 
competition by candidates. Then groups other than the median voter determine the 
equilibrium policies.
11 
Special interests have influence on policy outcomes because not all citizens have 
sufficient interest to learn about issues in which they have no direct stake, and interest 
groups are a source of funds and information on public policies, gives them influence on 
policy outcomes. In one recent model, Persson and Tabellini, assume that politicians 
from two different parties maximize their chance of winning an election by committing to 
announced taxation and spending platforms.
12 The key features of the model are that 
 
10 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957). 
11 See Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, Political Economics and Public Finance, in Handbook of Public 
Economics, Vol. 3 1549 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds. 2002) for a recent review. 
12 Id.7
voters have differing levels of party bias, or ideology, and that groups of voters can 
promise policy-conditional contributions to the politicians. In equilibrium, (1) blocks of 
voters with high proportions of policy-sensitive voters (swing voters) and (2) organized 
groups (lobbies) are over-represented in the political process relative to the socially 
optimal benchmark in which the total marginal benefit of spending across groups equals 
the social marginal cost of raising the funds. In addition, there is an inverse relationship 
between the extent of over-representation of lobbies and the size of the lobbies.  
The major tobacco manufacturers represent a small and “overrepresented” group. 
Smokers, as do abstainers in alcohol control policy, represent important “swing voters” in 
the issue of cigarette excise taxes as they have a larger stake in the specific policy and 
therefore more incentive to rely less on party ideology.  
As cigarette prices have increased and information about the adverse health effect 
of smoking has disseminated, smoking rates have declined.
13  As domestic consumption 
has declined, tobacco manufacturer output has fallen and there are fewer smokers to 
oppose policies adverse to smoking. As a result, one should observe increased adoption 
of such policies.  
A special feature of state tax and transfer policies, especially taxes on durable or 
semi-durable and portable goods, is that decisions made by other states affect an 
individual state’s optimal choice. Benjamin and Dougan developed a model of cigarette 
tax determination in which the relative ease in which cigarettes can be transported across 
state boundaries constrains their efficient taxation.
14 From this model, they obtain the 
prediction that excise taxes rise at a decreasing rate as one moves outward from the point 
 
13 Sloan, Osterman, & Picone, supra note 3. 
14 Daniel K. Benjamin & William R. Dougan, Efficient Excise Taxation: The Evidence from Cigarettes, 40 
J. Law & Econ. 113  (1997). 8
of production. Although they emphasized North Carolina as the key cigarette producing 
state, there are three major tobacco-producing states: North Carolina, Virginia, and 
Kentucky. An insight from this model is that excise taxes of bordering states affect the 
efficient level of taxation in the state. In addition, the preferences of voters in neighboring 
states are likely to be more similar. We explicitly account for border state excise taxes in 
our analysis, but do not consider distance from a particular producing state because we 
include state fixed effects, which also control for time-invariant regional preferences.  
Even as extended, the models do not incorporate specific shocks that may affect 
intertemporal variation in policy adoption. Legislative decisions may be sensitive to 
various business and election cycles. The political science literature has investigated the 
determinants of tax changes at the state level.
15 The following hypotheses have been 
considered:
16 tax increases are more likely 1) when states are facing fiscal crises; 2) early 
in a governor’s term in order to minimize the impact on reelection bids; 3) when political 
control of the state is conducive for passage (for example, when all branches are 
controlled by the same party).
17 
B. Cigarette Prices  
Four firms have dominated the market for cigarettes. Tax over-shifting is possible 
in many types of oligopoly models even though it is not possible in models of perfect 
 
15 Although our analysis is fundamentally economic, there is a history of whether public policy choices can 
be understood as a conventional economic good or alternatively whether it is desirable to introduce non-
economic preference variables into the study. See, for example, Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General 
Theory of Regulation, 19 J. Law & Econ. 211 (1976) and Matthew E. Kahn & John G. Matsusaka, Demand 
for Environmental Goods: Evidence from Voting Patterns on California Initiatives, 40 J. Law & Econ. 137 
(1997). 
16 Many of these hypotheses have been empirically tested as well (for example, Frances Stokes Berry & 
William D. Berry, Tax Innovation in the States: Capitalizing on Political Opportunity, 36 American Journal 
of Political Science 715 (1992)). 
17 Richard F. Winters, The Politics of Taxing and Spending, in Politics in the American States: A 
Comparative Analysis, 319 (Virginia Gray & Jacob Herbert eds., 6
th ed. 1996) and Berry and Berry, supra 
note 16. 9
competition.
18 Because oligopolistic firms have market power, they might find it optimal 
to raise price by more than the amount of the increase in excise tax in order to recover 
revenue lost by the reduction in quantity sold. The presence and extent of over-shifting 
depends on the nature of competition and the demand specification. For example, with a 
constant elasticity of demand and constant marginal costs, over-shifting of an excise tax 
must occur under pure monopoly, monopolistic competition, Cournot competition, and 
Bertrand competition with differentiated products.
19 Profits can even rise in short run 
with an increase in the excise tax rate.
20 Over-shifting has been measured empirically for 
a variety of products including cigarettes.
21 
In addition, the MSA could have provided cigarette companies with an 
opportunity to collude on prices by providing an external event in which to coordinate 
price increases.
22 Such coordination allows for implicit price collusion when explicit 
agreements are forbidden. Sumner derived a simple empirical specification based on a 
Cournot model of competition that allowed the estimation of the extent of 
competition/collusion in a market as measured by the markup in price over state excise 
 
18 Fullerton & Metcalf, supra note 5. 
19 For treatment of the cases of pure monopoly, monopolistic competition, and Cournot competition, see 
Fullerton & Metcalf, supra note 5. For treatment of Bertrand competition with differentiated products see 
Simon P. Anderson, André de Palma, & Brent Kreider, Tax Incidence in Differentiated Product Oligopoly, 
81 J. Pub. Econ. 173 (2001). 
20 Anderson, de Palma, & Kreider, supra note 19. 
21 James M. Poterba, Retail Price Reactions to Changes in State and Local Sales Taxes, 49 National Tax 
Journal 165 (1996); Timothy J. Besley & Harvey S. Rosen, Sales Taxes and Prices: An Empirical Analysis, 
52 National Tax Journal 157 (1999); Douglas J. Young & Agnieszka Bielinska-Kwapisz, Alcohol Taxes 
and Beverage Prices, 55 National Tax Journal 57 (2002); Daniel A. Sumner, Measurement of Monopoly 
Behavior: An Application to the Cigarette Industry, 89 J. Political Econ. 1010 (1981); Theodore E. Keeler 
et al., Do Cigarette Producers Price-Discriminate by State? An Empirical Analysis of Local Cigarette 
Pricing and Taxation, 15 J. Health Econ. 499 (1996). 
22 Harris, supra note 6. 10
taxes.
23 Modifying this specification slightly allowed us to determine whether the extent 
of competition changed in the cigarette industry after the MSA.
24 
II. DATA AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION  
  A. Overview 
We used a pre-post regression design to test whether the litigation substituted for 
(crowd out) or complemented (crowd in) state excise taxes. Evidence of crowd in would 
suggest that the settlement-related litigation altered the political equilibrium of states, 
while the former would suggest that state legislatures re-optimized, given fixed 
constraints. We divided the time period from 1990 to 2002 into four sub periods: pre-
settlements (1990 to 1992 and 1993 to 1997) and post-settlements (1998 and 1999 to 
2002). The test of the competing hypotheses was a simple significance test of indicator 
variables for these sub periods after controlling for other political and economic factors 
that determine excise tax levels. A similar approach was used to test for changes in the 
pricing structure of cigarettes caused by the settlements. 
Evidence of structural shifts in a pre-post analysis does not rule out causes of the 
structural shifts other than litigation and the resulting settlements. For this reason, we 
conducted a parallel analysis of state excise taxes on beer. Beer provides an interesting 
comparison because, like cigarette tax, beer excise taxes are regressive and are known to 
affect harmful consumption, such as heavy drinking among youths.
25 The crucial 
 
23 Sumner, supra note 21. 
24 For other approaches to measuring the extent of competition in a market using excise taxes see Daniel 
Sullivan, Testing Hypotheses about Firm Behavior in the Cigarette Industry, 93 J. Political Econ. 586 
(1985) and Paul G. Barnett, Theodore E. Keeler, & Teh-wei Hu, Oligopoly Structure and the Incidence of 
Cigarette Excise Taxes, 57 J. Pub. Econ. 457 (1995);  
25 See Michael Grossman, Douglas Coate, & Gregory M. Arluck, Price Sensitivity of Alcohol Beverages in 
the United States, in Control Issues in Alcohol Abuse Prevention: Strategies for States and Communities 
(Harold D. Holder ed. 1987); Michael Grossman et al., Effects of Alcohol Price Policy on Youth: A 
Summary of Economic Research, 4 J. Research on Adolescence 347 (1994); Douglas Coate & Michael 11
difference between excise taxes on cigarettes and beer was that major litigation was not 
pursued against beer companies as it was against cigarette companies. Thus, we would 
not expect to see significant changes in beer taxes due to the tobacco settlements.  
  B. Data  
We collected data on state excise taxes and determinants of state excise taxes as 
indicated in the theory from a variety of sources for 1990 to 2002.
26 There was substantial 
variation in cigarette excise tax rates across states and over time (Table 1).
27 Virginia had 
the minimum excise tax of $0.025/pack in 2002 while Massachusetts had the maximum 
rate of $1.51/pack in 2002. Cigarette taxes were approximately 15 times as high per unit 
of consumption as excise taxes on beer. Figure 2 shows the mean excise taxes across 
states over time relative to their initial levels in 1990. There was a clear positive linear 
trend over the sample period for real cigarette taxes with a spike in 2002. The mean real 
excise tax on beer fell over the sample period except for a small increase in 1998.  
Smokers were the most likely swing voters, those most concerned with cigarette 
policy; we included state-level smoking rates in the analysis. On average, we expected 
smokers to oppose additional taxes leading to a negative correlation between the smoking 
rate and the excise tax. However, some research has noted that smokers may rationally 
vote for cigarette tax increases as a way to regulate their own smoking and the negative 
 
Grossman, Effects of Alcoholic Beverage Prices and Legal Drinking Ages on Youth Alcohol Use, 31 J. 
Law & Econ. 145 (1988); Donald S. Kenkel, Drinking, Driving and Deterrence: The Social Costs of 
Alternative Policies, 36 J. Law & Econ. 877 (1993); and Philip J. Cook & Michael J. Moore, This Tax’s 
For You: The Case for Higher Beer Taxes, 47 National Tax Journal 559 (1994). These results were 
sensitive to controls for unobserved factors at the state level through state fixed effects; see, for example, 
Thomas S. Dee, State Alcohol Policies, Teen Drinking and Traffic Fatalities, 72 J. Pub. Econ. 289 (1999). 
All of our specifications include state fixed effects. 
26 See Appendix for a thorough discussion of data sources and variable construction. 
27 All dollar (cents) values were converted to real 2002 dollars (cents) for the analysis. 12
health consequences associated with it.
28 The argument is that state cigarette excise taxes 
are a self-control device. If favored by smokers, one would expect that higher 
percentages of smokers would lead to higher rather than lower excise tax rates. 
The presence of cigarette producers in the state as a special interest group was 
accounted for using the volume of tobacco leaf production.
29 In competitive markets, 
producers would have incentives to oppose taxes on their products as these raise marginal 
costs of production. However, the nature of the supply side of the market for cigarettes 
and its implications for tax over-shifting reduces the incentives for producers to avoid 
taxes. 
Another set of variables controlled for factors that affected state policy goals for 
cigarette excise taxes. The federal excise tax on cigarettes, the presence of a “Smoker 
Protection” law, an index for clean air regulations, and received MSA payments were 
included to test whether these substituted or complemented excise taxes in state policy 
goals. Federal excise taxes could crowd out state excise taxes if state taxes were near an 
optimal level before any change in the federal level. However, if political factors, such as 
lobbying at the state level, had prevented an optimal level of taxes, then an increase in the 
federal rate could provide an opportunity (for example, weakening the political clout of 
the industry) for the state to approach the optimum (crowd in). “Smoker Protection” laws 
reserved smoking-permitted areas in public locales, usually as a response to clean air 
regulations elsewhere. Clean air regulations were aggregated into one categorical variable 
 
28 Mark Crain et al., Rational Choice and the Taxation of Sin, 8 J. Pub. Econ. 239 (1977); Gruber & 
Köszegi, supra note 3. 
29 Health organizations could have also lobbied to influence cigarette taxes in an effort to deter smoking. 
We were able to collect membership numbers for the American Heart Association, the American Medical 
Association, the American Association of Retired Persons, and public school teachers for one year of our 
sample. These variables were uncorrelated with the fixed effects from our primary specification. 13
based on the number and type of public places where smoking was restricted: none 
(omitted), nominal, basic, moderate, and extensive.
30 
The minimum and maximum excise tax rate of bordering states captured the 
impact of neighboring states’ excise tax rates. As discussed above, due to issues such as 
border crossing, smuggling, and lobbying by producers, the political equilibrium in which 
excise taxes are set is influenced by taxes in neighboring states.
31 The mean taxes in 
bordering states were much larger (maximum: $0.56) and smaller (minimum: $0.19) than 
mean taxes ($0.40), implying that states have some discretion in setting excise taxes on 
cigarettes and are not merely “tax takers.”  
We also included three sets of variables as indicated by the political science 
literature on tax determination. First, the fiscal health of the state was measured by the 
appropriated ending balance for the fiscal year net of appropriated tobacco revenues. This 
definition most closely matched the information set of government officials at the time 
they were determining cigarette excise tax rates. It also clearly identifies the role that 
tobacco taxation must play in order to balance states’ budgets. Large budget deficits 
could lead to increases in excise taxes, although other avenues for decreasing deficits 
such as other revenue sources and cuts in expenditures might weaken this relationship.   
Second, the election cycle was measured using dummies for gubernatorial 
election years and “off” years that did not have an election or did not immediately follow 
an election year; years following an election year were the omitted category. Berry and 
 
30 United States Department of Health and Human Services, Reducing the Health Consequences of 
Smoking: 25 Years of Progress (1989). 
31 Benjamin & Dougan, supra note 14. 14
Berry found that politicians could minimize the negative political consequences of tax 
increases by maximizing the time between the tax increase and the next election.
32 
Third, political control was measured by an ideology index that increases in the 
number of branches of government (governor, house, and senate) controlled by 
Democrats and by an institutional control dummy indicating years in which all three 
branches were controlled by the same party, Democrat or Republican. Democrats have 
tended to prefer a larger role for government services and changes in legislation are easier 
to implement when the same party controls all branches of the government.
33 
Two groups in the population receive special attention in the tobacco policy 
debate: teens due to the fact that the majority of smokers start at this age
34 and the elderly 
who experience the health consequences of smoking. We included the proportion of the 
states’ population ages 10 to19 and 65 and over to test the sensitivity of excise taxes to 
these important segments of the population. Finally, wealth was measured by income per 
capita. 
The effect of the settlements was measured from the parameter estimates on the 
period binaries. However, this attributes all of the inter-temporal changes to the 
settlements. Other factors could have affected states’ decisions about taxes in general and 
excise taxes on “sin” goods in particular. For this reason, we used state excise taxes on 
beer as a comparison.  
We reproduced the model for cigarettes as closely as possible for excise taxes on 
beer. There were a few minor differences. The presence of swing voters was measured 
 
32 Berry & Berry, supra note 16. 
33 Id. 
34 Jonathan Gruber & Jonathan Zinman, Youth Smoking in the U.S.: Evidence and Implications, in Risky 
Behavior Among Youth: An Economic Analysis 69 (Jonathan Gruber ed. 2001). 15
using the share of the state population that abstained from any alcohol consumption 
(abstainer rates). The regulatory laws for beer included the blood alcohol concentration 
considered illegal per se and the presence of an open container, anti-consumption, and/or 
dram shop law (by statute or case law).  
C. Analysis of Excise Taxes 
We specified a linear model for cigarette and beer excise taxes in state s at time t,
taxst, of the following form:  
( ) ( ) ( ) st s st st X tax ￿ µ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + + + ￿ + + ￿ = 2002 1999 1998 1997 1993 3 2 1 . (1) 
The parameters of interest were the parameters on the time-period indicators. The pre- 
and post-MSA periods were further subdivided into two sub periods for consistency with 
the price analysis below: 1990 to 1992, 1993 to 1997, 1998, and 1999 to 2002. The 
parameter for 1998 captured any immediate shift in policy, while the parameter for 1999 
to 2002 captured any long-term structural change in excise taxes. The variables included 
in Xst, the variables described in the previous section, were meant to capture the important 
features from the theoretical models of taxation reviewed above. The error component 
was decomposed into a state-specific fixed effect (µs) and a mean zero error (!st). 
In an alternate specification, we specified states’ smoking rates as endogenous 
and used a instrumental variables method to account for endogeneity. The decision 
whether or not to smoke responds to price, part of which includes excise taxes. Thus, a 
negative correlation between excise taxes and smoking rates could be due to smokers 
responding to taxes, not taxes responding to smokers. Instruments excluded from the state 
excise tax equation included state-level averages/proportions for demographic variables 16
shown to influence the smoking decision: education level, gender, marital status, 
pregnancy, health insurance, and exercise.
35 
D. Analysis of Cigarette Prices 
To test for over-shifting of the tax by cigarette producers and changes in the 
extent of over-shifting after the MSA, we specified the following linear model similar to 
Sumner:
36 
( ) ( )
() () ( )
() st s
t st
st st st st
fedtax tax
tax tax tax price
￿ µ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
+ + ￿
+ + ￿ + + ￿ ￿
+ ￿ + ￿ ￿ + + =
2002 1999
1998 1997 1993 2002 1999
1998 1997 1993
8
7 6 5 4
3 2 1 0
(2) 
Sumner’s model is based on a model of Cournot competition.
37 In his model, state excise 
taxes are a proxy for the marginal costs faced by cigarette producers; other costs are 
controlled for using state and year fixed effects. Thus, the coefficient on state excise taxes 
not only measures over-shifting, but also measures the extent of competition in the 
market. In this specification, "3and "4capture any changes in over-shifting/competition 
after the MSA. We also estimated the markup over the federal excise tax, fedtaxt, on 
cigarettes. Other time varying costs were captured in three time dummies that represent 
three distinct periods in the price evolution over our sample (see Fig. 2). The 
specification allows for state fixed effects (µs) in order to control for costs other than 
excise taxes that cigarette companies faced. We considered two measures of the price of 
cigarettes: the weighted average price per pack including and excluding generic brands.  
 
35 Frank A. Sloan & Justin G. Trogdon, The Impact of the Master Settlement Agreement on Cigarette 
Consumption (Working paper, Duke Univ. 2003). We used the same instruments to control for the possible 
endogeneity of abstainer rates in the beer tax regression. 
36 Sumner, supra note 21. 
37 Id. 17
III. RESULTS 
A. Excise Taxes 
The fixed effect results indicate that state excise taxes on cigarettes were eight 
cents higher on average in the year of the settlements than in 1990 to 1992 (Table 2). 
Since implementation, cigarette excise taxes were ten cents higher than in 1990 to 1992. 
In addition, judging from the parameter estimates on the period variables, there were no 
significant shifts in excise taxes on beer after the settlements (see fixed effect results in 
Table 3). These results suggest that litigation complements excise taxes as tobacco 
control policy and that the litigation and resulting settlements shifted the political 
equilibrium and reduced the constraints to higher excise taxes on cigarettes, but not for 
beer. Controlling for state-level heterogeneity substantially affected the results (compare 
fixed effects to ordinary least squares (OLS) in Table 2). 
The smoking rate was negatively related to excise taxes. As mentioned 
previously, the correlation could have been due to the importance of smokers as swing 
voters (who oppose higher taxes) or to people responding to higher prices through 
smoking cessation. Using instrumental variables (IV) including fixed effects did not yield 
results meaningfully different from those shown.
38 
Tobacco leaf production was included to measure the strength of the cigarette 
industry as a lobbying force in each state. The OLS results seemed to confirm common 
intuition—states with higher levels of tobacco production had lower cigarette excise 
taxes. However, this relationship was purely cross-sectional. Within each state, changes 
 
38 For cigarette and beer excise tax analysis, Hausman tests failed to reject the null hypotheses that the fixed 
effect and IV estimates were equivalent. The instruments were jointly significant in the first stage. We also 
failed to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments were exogenous to the excise tax equation using a 
Hansen test. 18
in the level of tobacco production were not associated with changes in the state excise 
tax.  
The federal excise tax on cigarettes, as the settlements, were complements with 
state excise taxes. Federal increases in excise taxes relax political constraints at the state 
level that prevented higher state taxes before the increase. For instance, state politicians 
could infer from the federal legislation that the tobacco producers’ lobby has lost 
influence in the promise of votes or campaign contributions. With a reduced lobbying 
influence, state excise taxes can approach the efficient level.
39 
In the OLS results for both cigarettes and beer excise taxes, stricter consumption 
laws were associated with higher excise taxes, suggesting complementarities. Stricter 
clean air laws for cigarette smoking and higher blood-alcohol concentration and the 
presence of a dram shop law via case law led to higher excise taxes on cigarettes and 
beer, respectively. The fixed effects results, which control for time-invariant unobserved 
sentiment at the state level, suggest that consumption laws and excise taxes were weak 
substitutes for one another in the policy goal of reducing harmful consumption: extensive 
clean air laws led to lower excise taxes on cigarettes and stricter blood alcohol content 
rules and the presence of an open container law lead to lower excise taxes on beer. 
However, there were not many observations available to identify this effect for cigarette 
excise taxes in the fixed effect specification. In particular, only eight states changed their 
clean air status over the sample period, and only one (North Carolina) had a change in 
clean air status since the implementation of the MSA in 1998.
40 
39 See discussion in Section IA supra.
40 The eight states were California, Delaware, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina, Tennessee, 
and Virginia. 19
States took account of excise taxes in their neighboring states in setting their own 
excise tax rates. The fixed effects estimates imply that as the maximum cigarette excise 
tax in bordering states increased by $1, the state’s own cigarette excise tax increased by 
$0.24, supporting the view that decisions of neighboring states constrain a state’s choice 
of its excise tax rate. Taxes in bordering states were also significant in the analysis of 
excise taxes on beer, a product without geographic concentration in production. This 
suggests that the informational/precedent-setting effect is important for excise taxes in 
general. 
Lower ending balances for the states’ fiscal years led to higher cigarette excise 
taxes, but not for excise taxes on beer. States were more likely to use excise taxes on 
cigarettes than beer to fill gaps in the budget during 1990 to 2002. This could have 
happened for two reasons. First, assuming that excise taxes on both products were near, 
but just under the revenue maximizing level and that a budget deficit necessitated a tax 
increase, the less price responsive good would provide the larger revenue increase for an 
increase in the excise tax. Second, this effect could be a spillover effect of the shift in the 
political constraints caused by the tobacco litigation and settlements. 
Of the political variables, Democratic control of the state government led to 
higher excise taxes on cigarettes, perhaps because Democrats have traditionally favored 
higher public expenditures. Timing in gubernatorial election cycles and single-party 
control of the state did not affect cigarette excise taxes.
41 
Income was insignificant in the fixed effect specifications for both cigarettes and 
beer.  In both the OLS and the fixed effect specifications, larger youth populations (as a 
 
41 Excise taxes on beer were lower in years in which a single political party controlled the state 
government.  20
share of the total state population) lead to higher cigarette excise taxes. This relationship 
could indicate the use of excise taxes as a deterrent to smoking initiation. In fact, most 
teens in this age group cannot vote and thus cannot form a coalition to oppose such 
action. Higher elderly populations as a share of the state population did not significantly 
affect cigarette excise taxes in the fixed effect specification, but led to lower excise taxes 
on beer. 
B. Pricing 
The coefficient on state excise taxes indicated substantial over-shifting in both 
price categories (see Table 4). For each $1 increase in state excise taxes, the retail price 
of cigarettes including generic brands increased $1.38 and the retail price of premium 
cigarettes, excluding generic brands, increased $1.29. For the price of cigarettes including 
generic brands, the markup over the state excise tax was not significantly different than in 
1990 to 1992. For the price of premium cigarettes, excluding generic brands, the markup 
over the state excise tax was lower in the period 1999 to 2002. The results suggested that 
cigarette companies also over-shifted the federal excise tax more than state taxes.
42 The 
difference in magnitude could be due to concerns of interstate smuggling for state excise 
taxes that were not present at the federal level. The period 1993 to 1997 had lower prices 
due to price reductions for premium cigarettes by the cigarette manufacturers. The period 
1999 to 2002 had prices $0.76 higher than in 1990 to 1992. This markup was greater than 
that needed to cover the per pack cost of the settlements. This suggests that the cigarette 
companies shifted the cost of the settlements to consumers. 
 
42 Barnett, Keeler, & Hu, supra note 24, also found that increases in federal excise taxes lead to larger 
increases in price than did similar increases in state excise taxes. 21
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
The settlements significantly affected both state cigarette excise taxes and the 
price of cigarettes. State excise taxes increased in response to the MSA by approximately 
$0.08 per pack in 1998 and an additional $0.02 per pack in 1999 to 2002, which is 
consistent with the argument that the litigation altered the political equilibrium by 
reducing the constraints to raising excise taxes that previously prevented an optimal level 
of excise tax. Cigarette companies passed increases in excise taxes onto consumers. For 
every dollar increase in state excise taxes, the price of cigarettes increased by $1.38. In 
addition, the price of cigarettes in the post-MSA period were $0.76 higher than in the 
period 1990-1992, before the large increase in litigation against the tobacco industry. 
Thus, the cigarette companies passed on not only the cost of the payments to the states, 
which because of volume adjustments could be considered similar to an increase in 
excise taxes, but also passed on the increased excise taxes that resulted from the MSA. 
The results help explain why the tobacco manufacturers would strongly oppose 
excise tax increases and react adversely to litigation resulting in a settlement like the 
MSA. It is not because that they bear the burden of the taxes. They do not; in fact, there is 
substantial overshifting. Rather, they fear the change in the political equilibrium and the 
adverse effects to their business interests that are likely to result. 
Overall, is litigation used as a device to improve the public health is ultimately in 
the public interest? In terms of the health benefits resulting from the price increases, one 
would answer  “yes,”
43 but improved health must be offset, at least in part, by the welfare 
loss to smokers through reduced consumption. Quantifying the magnitude of this loss is 
 
43 Sloan & Trogdon, supra note 35. 22
controversial,
44 and debating this issue is beyond the scope of this study. Furthermore, 
how the receipts from the MSA have been allocated has been a subject of great 
controversy, the discussion of which is a study in itself.
45 But given the political clout of 
tobacco, at least historically, it seems improbable that legislatures would set policies, 
both tax and other, at levels that would be set by a social dictator. Litigation may be 
advantageous in changing the political equilibrium and in enforcing agreements. 
One limitation of this study was the relatively small post-MSA period of four 
years. In particular, state excises taxes increased dramatically in 2002, the last year of our 
sample. From articles in the press, it is likely that the average excise tax on cigarettes will 
again increase in 2003. A longer post-MSA sample would allow researchers to determine 
if the large increases in recent years were linked to the MSA but delayed due to lags in 
the political and budgetary process, or if the increases were a temporary response to other 
factors such as economic recession. 
Another limitation of this study is that other tobacco related events occurred 
concurrently with the MSA. Many of these events, such as the Federal Trade 
Commission litigation against Joe Camel, revealed new information to the public about 
the harmful and additive nature of cigarettes and the operations of the cigarette producers. 
Such information could affect smoking sentiment at the state level around the time of the 
settlement. To the extent that changes in public sentiment affect smoking rates and 
restrictions on public smoking, we have controlled for such changes in the analysis.
46 In 
 
44 Manning, Keeler, & Newhouse, supra note 3; Viscusi, supra note 9; Gruber & Köszegi, supra note 3. 
45 Cary P. Gross et al, State Expenditures for Tobacco-Control Programs and the Tobacco Settlement, 347 
New Engl. J. Med. 1080 (2002); Frank A. Sloan et al., States’ Allocations of Funds from the Master 
Settlement Agreement with Tobacco Companies: Evidence from Six States (Working paper, Duke Univ. 
2003); Emily Streyer Carlisle et al., Determinants of States’ Allocations of the Master Settlement 
Agreement Payments (Working paper, Duke Univ. 2003)  
46 The data reveal very little variation within states in smoking restrictions post-settlements. 23
addition, since the lawsuits were filed by the states, tobacco companies admitted that 
smoking is harmful for the first time. Thus, new information and accompanying changes 
in public sentiment due to these revelations should be rightly attributed to the settlements. 
However, our measure of the effect of the MSA could have resulted from changes in 
voter preferences due to litigation other than the MSA. 
During the current recession, states have come to depend on settlement payments 
to fill budget deficits. Therefore, states now have incentives to maintain the solvency of 
cigarette companies. The companies have maintained that the implementation of the 
MSA has had a negative impact on their profits. However, the oligopoly models reviewed 
above suggested that profits could have actually increased in the short run. The actual 
impact of the MSA on cigarette companies’ profits is an area for future research. 24
APPENDIX 
DATA SOUCES 
Price and tax data for cigarettes were collected by state and year from the Tax 
Burden on Tobacco.
47 Beer taxes were collected from the Alcohol Epidemiology 
Program at the University of Minnesota and from the Tax Foundation website.
48 These 
data were also used to calculate the maximum and minimum excise taxes in bordering 
states for each state.  
Data on tobacco leaf production was collected from the United States Department 
of Agriculture (USDA).
49 The 16 states that produce tobacco leaf had missing values for 
1990. 
State-level smoking rates, abstainer (from alcohol) rates, and instruments for these 
rates were calculated using data from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s 
(CDC) Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) for years 1990-2002. The 
BRFSS is collected annually from a nationally representative sample of the U.S. adult 
population. A person was considered to be a smoker if he/she reported to have smoked 
everyday; occasional or irregular smokers were considered non-smokers. A person was 
considered to have abstained from alcohol if he/she reported zero drinks in the past 
month. State-level rates were computed using the sampling weights provided in the 
survey.  
There were missing observations from this data for states that did not participate 
in the BRFSS in the early years of our sample. The alcohol questions were in a rotation 
 
47 Orzechowski & Walker, The Tax Burden on Tobacco: Historical Compilation 2002, Vol. 37 (2002). 
48 Alcohol Epidemiology Program (unpublished data, Univ. Minnesota, School of Public Health 2003); Tax 
Foundation, Various State Tax Rates, http://www.taxfoundation.org/variousrates.html, visited January 7, 
2003. 
49 United States Department of Agriculture, Crop Production—Annual Summary (Various 1991-2002).  25
core and not used in every year in every state. We interpolated state-level abstainer rates 
for these states and years using results from a regression of smoking rate on time and 
time squared.  
Fiscal variables were collected from various editions of The Fiscal Survey of 
States from 1989 to 2002.
50 Three state/years were missing from this data source.  
Election cycle and political control variables were collected from a number of 
sources: Statistical Abstract of the United States, Book of the States, and the National 
Governors Association website.
51 The political control variables had 13 missing 
state/years. 
State income per capita was collected from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
52 
Variables concerning states’ tobacco regulation were collected from the CDC’s 
State Tobacco Activities Tracking and Evaluation (STATE) System. The presence of 
“Smoker Protection” laws was obtained from State Legislated Actions on Tobacco 
Issues.
53 
States’ alcohol regulatory laws were collected from various editions of the 
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics from 1990 to 2002.
54 There were 38 missing 
values for illegal levels of blood alcohol content.  
The amount of money collected from the MSA by state was collected from the 
Show Us the Money: An Update on the States' Allocation of the Tobacco Settlement 
Dollars.
55 
50 National Governors Association & National Association of State Budget Officers, The Fiscal Survey of 
States (Various 1989-2002). 
51 United States, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States (2001); Council of State 
Governments & American Legislators’ Association, The Book of the States (1990-1991); National 
Governors Association, http://www.nga.org, visited January 28, 2003. 
52 U.S. Department of Commerce, http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/data.htm, visited March 4, 2003. 
53 Coalition on Smoking OR Health. State Legislated Actions on Tobacco Issues (2001). 
54 United States Department of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics (Various 1990-2002). 26
The fraction of the state population ages 10-19 and 65 and over was collected 
from the Bureau of the Census. Age breakdowns by state were not yet available for youth 
from the 2000 Census. Thus, the fraction of the state population ages 10-19 was predicted 
using state-specific linear trends for 2000-2002.  
 
55 Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids et al., Show Us the Money: An Update on the States' Allocation of the 
Tobacco Settlement Dollars (2002). 27
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Table 1. Summary Statistics: 1990-2002 
Variable N  Mean  Std.  Dev.
Cigarette
State Excise Tax on Cigarettes (cents/pack)  650  39.89  26.23 
Federal Excise Tax on Cigarettes (cents/pack)  650  29.02  4.51 
Smoking Rate (%)  637  23.16  2.94 
Tobacco Leaf Production (millions lbs)  634  26.70  94.24 
Appropriated Ending Balance Net of Tobacco 
Revenues (millions $) 
647 0.03  0.04 
Maximum Tax in Bordering State  650  55.51  27.30 
Minimum Tax in Bordering State  650  19.44  16.04 
Smoker Protection Law  650  0.52  0.50 
Clean Air Index: Nominal  650  0.12  0.33 
Clean Air Index: Basic  650  0.17  0.37 
Clean Air Index: Moderate  650  0.26  0.44 
Clean Air Index: Extensive  650  0.40  0.49 
Real Tobacco Settlement Payments ($/capita)  650  7.92  17.59 
Beer
State Excise Tax on Beer (cents/12 ounce drink)  650  2.73  2.22 
Federal Excise Tax on Beer (cents/12 ounce drink)  650  6.05  0.85 
Abstainer Rate (%)  650  48.06  10.87 
Appropriated Ending Balance Net of Alcohol 
Revenues (millions $) 
647 0.03  0.04 35
Maximum Tax in Bordering State  650  4.11  2.76 
Minimum Tax in Bordering State  650  1.09  1.03 
Blood Alcohol Concentration: Illegal per se  612  0.10  0.01 
Open Container Law by Statute  650  0.61  0.49 
Anti-consumption Law by Statute  650  0.79  0.40 
Dram Shop Law by Statute  650  0.72  0.45 
Dram Shop Law via Case Law  650  0.14  0.34 
Explanatory Variables in Both Cigarette and Beer 
Analysis
Gubernatorial Election Year  650  0.30  0.46 
Gubernatorial Off Year  650  0.46  0.50 
Index of Democratic Control (0 to 1)  637  0.49  0.35 
Single-Party Control  637  0.41  0.49 
Real Income ($1000/capita)  650  27.66  4.35 
Population 10-19 years (%)  650  14.60  1.46 
Population 65 and over (%)  650  12.63  2.00 
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Table 2. Regression Analysis: State Excise Tax on Cigarettes (cents/pack) 
  Fixed Effects  Least Squares 
  Coefficient Std.  Error Coefficient Std.  Error 
1993  to  1997  3.371 2.093  1.287 2.628 
1998 8.241*  3.429  1.882  3.804 
1999 to 2002  10.201**  3.619  2.261  3.818 
Smoking Rate (%)  -1.111*  0.435  -0.856**  0.327 
Tobacco Leaf Production 
(millions lbs) 
0.042 0.029  -0.031**  0.010 
Federal Excise Tax on 
Cigarettes (cents/pack) 
0.465
+ 0.247 0.708*  0.352 
Smoker Protection Law  -2.606  3.111  -6.419**  1.760 
Clean Air Index: Nominal  2.491  5.687  -3.437  4.605 
Clean Air Index: Basic  -19.520  12.496  9.458*  4.715 
Clean Air Index: Moderate  -10.502  9.738  16.112**  4.703 
Clean Air Index: Extensive  -14.253*  6.413  11.073*  4.691 
Real Tobacco Settlement 
Payments ($/capita) 
-0.031 0.053  -0.015 0.074 
Maximum Tax in Bordering 
State 
0.238** 0.043 -0.095*  0.038 
Minimum Tax in Bordering 
State 
0.246** 0.085  0.433** 0.068 
Appropriated Ending Balance  -39.298
+ 21.425 -63.830** 21.154 37
Net of Tobacco Revenues 
(millions $) 
Gubernatorial  Election  Year  1.201 1.559  1.430 2.381 
Gubernatorial  Off  Year  -0.500 1.355  -0.387 2.058 
Index of Democratic Control 
(0 to 1) 
11.352** 2.669  10.624** 2.735 
Single-Party  Control  -1.960 1.366  -1.968 1.803 
Population 10-19 years (%)  6.482**  1.592  3.106**  0.990 
Population 65 and over (%)  2.177  2.171  1.461**  0.567 
Real Income ($1000/capita)  -0.661  0.738  2.424**  0.336 
Constant -66.411
+ 39.568 -104.052**  30.542 
N 605   605  
R
2 0.38   0.48  
F 14.98**   24.48**  
NOTE.—The fixed effect specification includes fixed effects for states. 
+ Significant at the 0.10 level based on a two-tailed test. 
* Significant at the 0.05 level based on a two-tailed test. 
** Significant at the 0.01 level based on a two-tailed test. 38
Table 3. Regression Analsis: State Excise Tax on Beer (cents/12 ounce drink) 
  Fixed Effects  Least Squares 
  Coefficient Std.  Error Coefficient Std.  Error 
1993  to  1997  0.017 0.124  -0.008 0.197 
1998 0.002  0.225  0.544
+ 0.316 
1999  to  2002  0.117 0.212  0.143 0.236 
Abstainer Rate (%)  0.010  0.009  0.068**  0.009 
Federal Excise Tax on Beer 
(cents/12 ounce drink) 
0.043 0.049  -0.048 0.094 
Blood Alcohol Concentration: 
illegal per se 
18.787** 6.839  -36.658** 8.751 
Open Container Law by 
Statute 
-0.671** 0.185  0.383*  0.155 
Anti-consumption Law by 
Statute 
0.038 0.186  -1.335**  0.189 
Dram Shop Law by Statute  -  -  0.052  0.221 
Dram Shop Law via Case 
Law 
-0.186 0.329  1.620**  0.310 
Maximum Tax in Bordering 
State 
0.125** 0.030 -0.017  0.034 
Minimum Tax in Bordering 
State 
0.265 0.267  0.491**  0.100 
Appropriated  Ending  Balance  1.216 1.424  -1.951 1.853 39
Net of Alcohol Revenues 
(millions $) 
Gubernatorial  Election  Year  0.119 0.105  0.032 0.201 
Gubernatorial  Off  Year  0.059 0.090  -0.139 0.172 
Index of Democratic Control 
(0 to 1) 
-0.220 0.170  0.087 0.233 
Single-Party Control  -0.249**  0.091  0.109  0.148 
Population 10-19 years (%)  -0.007  0.103  -0.403**  0.083 
Population 65 and over (%)  -0.592**  0.138  -0.304**  0.045 
Real Income ($1000/capita)  -0.038  0.048  -0.103**  0.029 
Constant  8.479** 2.449  15.923** 2.525 
N 596   596  
R
2 0.16   0.42  
F 5.41**   20.48**  
NOTE.—The fixed effect specification includes fixed effects for states. 
+ Significant at the 0.10 level based on a two-tailed test. 
* Significant at the 0.05 level based on a two-tailed test. 
** Significant at the 0.01 level based on a two-tailed test. 40
Table 4. Fixed Effect Regression Analysis: Price of Cigarettes (cents/pack) 
 Including  Generics  Excluding  Generics 
  I II I II 
State Excise Tax on Cigarettes  1.378** 1.281** 1.287** 1.149**
(cents/pack) (0.079)  (0.030)  (0.088)  (0.033) 
State Excise Tax 1993 to 1997 -0.066 -  -0.062 - 
  (0.069) -  (0.077) - 
State Excise Tax 1998  -0.130  -  -0.129  - 
  (0.083) -  (0.092) - 
State Excise Tax 1999 to 2002 -0.090 -  -0.135
+ -
(0.070) -  (0.078) - 
Federal Excise Tax on   2.922**  2.925** 2.911** 2.906**
Cigarettes (cents/pack)  (0.139)  (0.139)  (0.155)  (0.154) 
1993 to 1997  -26.259**  -28.216** -28.193** -29.782**
(2.555) (1.163)  (2.839) (1.294) 
1998 7.153*  2.610  5.455  1.379 
  (3.428) (1.693)  (3.809) (1.884) 
1999 to 2002  76.553**  73.750** 80.069** 75.801**
(2.795) (1.674)  (3.106) (1.863) 
Constant 108.425**  111.447** 126.570** 131.095**
(4.209) (3.505)  (4.677) (3.900) 
N 650 650  650 650 
R
2 0.98 0.98  0.97 0.97 41
F 2981.02** 4771.97**  2422.39** 3865.71** 
NOTE.—All specifications include fixed effects for states. 
+ Significant at the 0.10 level based on a two-tailed test. 
* Significant at the 0.05 level based on a two-tailed test. 
** Significant at the 0.01 level based on a two-tailed test. 